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RESPECT FOR JUST REVENGE 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extra-
legal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgement we may make of such 
acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally 
wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it 
is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside 
morality, as a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to obey other compelling 
motives. This thesis is tested against various objections, notably those which doubt the 
intelligibility or application of such non-moral ‘respect’, or would assimilate it to moral 
approval; and it is distinguished from various positions with which it might be confused, 
such as the 'admirable immorality' of Slote, or the Nietzschean critique of morality. 
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RESPECT FOR JUST REVENGE 
 
 
I 
 
The thesis of this paper is that, under certain conditions, an act of private revenge may 
properly be the object of a special kind of positive judgement, even though it is at the 
same time rightly morally condemned. The name I propose for this positive judgement 
is ‘non-moral respect’. I will suggest in passing that respect of this kind can be extended 
to various other kinds of acts which are morally wrong, but the main focus of the paper 
will be upon revenge. 
 
By 'private revenge', I mean a deliberate injurious act or course of action against another 
person, motivated by resentment of an injurious act or acts performed by that other 
person against the revenger, or against some other person or persons whose injury the 
revenger resents. Both motive (vengeful resentment) and injurious act must be present 
to constitute revenge. Within the motive, we could distinguish further between the 
passive resentment that is a response to the injury received, and the active vengeful 
feeling that empowers the decision to strike back, but I will not pursue this distinction, 
since for revenge both components must be present: where only passive resentment is 
felt, we have not revenge but forbearance, or impotent embitterment.  
 
The adjective ‘private’ serves to exclude cases in which the revenger acts with 
institutional authority. We must set aside the important, but for present purposes 
 3
irrelevant, debates over whether institutionalised punishment is itself a form of revenge, 
is motivated by vengefulness, is necessary to prevent affronted citizens from acting 
vengefully, and so on.1 Some recent writers have sought to rehabilitate revenge as a 
justification, or legitimate function, of legal punishment, but I do not propose to build 
on these arguments to vindicate private revenge in moral terms.2  
 
I will assume, on the contrary, that we are all agreed that such revenge is indefensible 
within morality (and I will briefly say why); my purpose will be to show that it is 
capable, under certain conditions, of a well-founded respect which is based on its 
standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to follow 
other motives. The revenger in these cases acts as she does because she feels that her 
whole life would be spoiled or falsified if she did not pursue revenge, even though she 
knows she ought not to pursue it. I will suggest an analogy between these cases and 
certain acts expressive of love, such as protecting from detection and arrest one's child 
who is a violent criminal even though he is likely to continue to offend against others: 
one knows that one ought to prevent this, but decides that one's life would be spoiled if 
one injured the interests of one's child so deeply.  
 
Acts of revenge which may elicit respect need to be distinguished from other, 
superficially similar, acts which can justify no respect, such as sadistic acts against 
others for which retribution for an injury is a mere pretext; or cases where the original 
offence motivating revenge is too trivial for a reasonable person to resent, or the degree 
of retaliation is excessive, or the offender is afflicted by means of an injury to an 
innocent third party, or the vengeful act is reckless and unfocused (e.g. rushing out into 
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the street in a rage and shooting wildly). Eliminating these cases of sadistic, 
superfluous, disproportionate, misdirected, and whimsical revenge leaves us with acts of 
just, proportionate and accurately-directed revenge. Though I will assume that we all 
agree that these acts too are morally wrong, I will argue that they may be eligible for 
non-moral respect. 
 
 
II 
 
It will already be clear that some conceptual stage-setting is needed before the argument 
can proceed further. The idea of respect for an action, and in particular for an action 
morally disapproved of (non-moral respect), needs explanation; and an account of 
morality needs to be given which shows why respect for an act of revenge must 
necessarily be distinct from moral approval, and indeed needs to be consistent with 
moral disapproval.  
 
The latter task is the more difficult, since (as we shall see later) a likely type of 
objection to my argument is that the scope of moral approval, properly understood, 
embraces all the judgments I can plausibly ascribe to non-moral 'respect'. I will try to 
answer these objections as they arise, and for the moment will confine myself to 
indicating the kinds of widely-held moral principles which I take to condemn acts of 
revenge. I will assume that the condemnation has its justification either in altruism or in 
considerations of social safety. In the first place, an act of revenge causes harm or 
affliction to another, and so is denounced by the moral principle best summarised by 
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Schopenhauer: "Injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can".3 In 
the second place, a range of moral beliefs which can be formalised within quite diverse 
philosophical traditions -utilitarian, Kantian, contractarian- concur in disapproving 
private acts of revenge on the grounds that, once normalised through imitation and 
counter-retaliation, they destroy social order, including lawful means of redress, and 
return us to 'the war of each against each'. I will assume that both the agent who 
commits an act of revenge, and the observer who comments upon it, subscribe to at least 
one of these moral arguments, and so have no doubt that revenge is morally unjustified.  
 
In sketching these moral arguments which condemn private revenge, I have deliberately 
avoided invoking any connection between justice and morality. Some readers may 
already be disquieted by the suggestion, at the end of section I, that an act which is able 
to be characterised as 'just' may nevertheless be morally wrong. It would be possible, 
indeed, to argue that revenge is not morally wrong if it is just; or to argue that, because 
it is morally wrong, it cannot be just. To resolve these questions would require a fuller 
examination of the relation between morality and (retaliatory) justice than is possible in 
this paper. For the moment, I will simply suggest that the idea of a just but morally 
wrong action is not entirely counter-intuitive. If I strike you without good reason, and in 
response you strike me back, we may both be acting wrongly and both be breaking the 
law, but you have a ground for complaint over my action that I do not have over yours. 
You can appeal to a complaint-grounding reciprocal principle such as mutual 
forbearance or non-violence in interpersonal relations; I cannot consistently appeal to 
the same reciprocal principle, since I have myself have rendered such reciprocity of 
non-violence between us inoperative. Indeed any assumption of reciprocity should now 
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lead me to expect to be struck in return. We do not need to invoke the lex talionis to see 
that, in at least a minimal sense of the term, your act is just whereas mine was unjust.  
 
Respect for an action I define as a feeling of sympathy grounded in the belief, on the 
part of an observer, that she might herself intentionally and after sober deliberation have 
performed or wished to perform the action in the given circumstances as she 
understands them. (The addition of 'wished to perform' takes account of cases in which 
one respects an action which one lacks the skill or courage or energy to perform.) 
Respect for an action which the observer morally disapproves of requires an additional 
thought: "I might have performed or wished to perform this action without ceasing to be 
the morally serious person I take myself to be".  
 
It may help to understand this characterisation of respect for an action if we look at the 
parallel case of respect for another's belief  which one may or may not agree with.4 Here 
there are three rational alternatives among the four which are logically possible. 
 
A1 I agree with and respect your belief that X.  
A2 I agree with and do not respect your belief that X. 
A3 I disagree with, but respect, your belief that X. 
A4 I disagree with, and do not respect, your belief that X. 
 
In A1 the first proposition entails the second, while A2 is self-contradictory: to agree 
with a belief that X is to be conscious of being a person who believes that X, but 
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(adapting the definition of respect for action just given) not to respect the belief that X is 
not to believe that one could oneself agree that X. 
 
The difference between A3 and A4 is that in the case of A3, but not A4, I believe that I 
might have held belief X without ceasing to be the reasonable person I take myself to 
be. For example: I disagree with, but respect, the belief that George W. Bush was wrong 
to authorise an invasion of Iraq. I disagree with, and do not respect, the belief that 
George W. Bush is a literal incarnation of the Great Satan. The latter view is not eligible 
for consideration by a reasonable person, such as I take myself to be, whereas the 
former is a view which I might well have arrived at by the exercise of reason, though I 
have in fact concluded that it is false. 
 
If we turn now to the analysis of respect for actions, there is a considerable degree of 
symmetry, but also some crucial points of asymmetry, with the analysis of respect for 
beliefs. 
 
B1 I morally approve of your action Y, and I respect it. 
B2 I morally approve of your action Y, but I do not respect it. 
B3 I morally disapprove of your action Y, but I respect it. 
B4 I morally disapprove of your action Y, and I do not respect it. 
 
In B1, unlike A1, the first proposition entails the second only if we introduce a 
condition: that the observer is conscious of being a person capable of acting according 
to the requirements of morality. (A thoroughgoing immoralist might recognise the 
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action as the kind of thing approved of within morality, yet not respect it because she 
could not imagine herself intentionally performing it or wishing to do so.) We need the 
same condition to make B2, as well as A2, self-contradictory. The reason for the 
asymmetry here is that action, unlike belief, requires a voluntary commitment which can 
be refused: to agree with a belief is ipso facto to hold the belief, but to approve the 
performance of an action is not ipso facto to perform it, to be able to do so, or even to 
wish to do so. 
 
B3 and B4 differ in the same way as A3 and A4: in the case of B4, unlike B3, I believe 
that I could not perform Y without ceasing to be the morally serious person I take 
myself to be (assuming I do take myself to be such a person). (Incidentally, it should be 
admitted that there exist people for whom there are no examples of A3 or B3, who are 
unable to feel respect for beliefs which they do not agree with or actions which they do 
not morally approve.)  
 
However, there is a crucial difference between A3 and B3. In the case of A3, it is 
impossible for the other person to assent to my judgement, since it is logically 
impossible to disagree with one's own belief. In the case of B3, the other person may 
assent: that is, she may agree that her action should be morally disapproved of, yet 
understand that I might respect it in the sense that I believe that intentionally and after 
sober deliberation I might have performed or wished to perform the action in the given 
circumstances. The importance of this difference lies in the fact that an agent 
performing an act of revenge may take up the position represented by B3, not least to 
preserve her own self-respect. 
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III 
 
I maintain, then, that B3 judgements exist; and I believe we will understand our own 
collective attitudes to revenge better if we acknowledge that they do, and reflect upon 
the significance of B3 judgements about revenge.  
 
Two related objections are likely to suggest themselves at once. We might deny the 
coherence of B3, that is, deny that there exist actions which justify both moral 
disapproval and non-moral respect. I have already said that there exist people for whom 
there are no instances of B3: perhaps they are right. Or we might reject as a confusion 
the concept of non-moral 'respect' itself. These are mutually supporting objections, since 
if there is no such thing as non-moral respect, there cannot be actions to which it is 
applicable; and if there are no intentional actions contrary to morality which merit some 
kind of non-moral benign response from observers, then there is no need for what I have 
labelled 'non-moral respect'. Both the thesis and the two objections seem to require to be 
tested across the field of imaginable examples, and I will try to clarify and vindicate the 
thesis by bringing forward examples which will advance the debate. 
 
The first objection can be developed as follows. There is no realm outside morality in 
which respect for actions can nevertheless be accorded. Across the range of actions 
which may be supposed to be candidates for B3, those that are really respect-worthy are 
the morally justified ones (or actions are respect-worthy to the extent that they are 
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morally justified); conversely, those that are not morally justified are not respect-
worthy. Separating actions into these two categories by the application of moral 
judgement removes the need for any 'special' kind of non-moral respect. 
 
I begin to reply to this objection with my first example.  
 
Alberto's daughter is shot dead by a Ruritanian diplomat. Because of diplomatic 
immunity, and the absence of reciprocal trial or extradition agreements between 
Italy and Ruritania, the killer is able to return home without facing charges. So 
poor is the historic relationship between the two countries that Alberto knows 
that the likelihood of legal redress in his lifetime is negligible. He believes in the 
Christian morality of forgiveness, and the secular consequentalist arguments for 
the futility of revenge -perhaps he even believes that his immortal soul is forfeit 
if he kills someone- but he finds that he cannot live out the rest of his life 
without an unbearable and perpetual sense that the most important thing in it, the 
only thing that now gives it meaning, his urge to revenge his daughter, is 
unrealised. He tracks the killer to Ruritania and shoots him dead. 
 
Consider, first, whether you judge Alberto's action to be morally right or wrong. Then, 
consider whether you feel respect for his action. Does the course of reflection on the 
second point precisely map the course of reflection on the first?  
 
I believe most people will have difficulty in confirming that it does, if only because they 
are more likely to hesitate over the second question than the first. The action is a 
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dreadful one, and a crime in any civilised jurisdiction, so moral disapproval seems 
clearly in order, yet that disapproval is likely to be accompanied (as it would not be in 
the case of an unprovoked murder) by a certain misgiving as to unequivocally negative 
judgement, a misgiving which I will shortly try to explain and justify. 
 
It is tempting to explain this misgiving, and at the same time preserve the dominion of 
morality over the example, by saying that one morally disapproves of the action, while 
feeling moral approval for a significant aspect of Alberto’s motives. His motives are 
closely associated with his love for his daughter, and since loving one’s close relatives 
is viewed favourably by most moral systems, we are not, according to this view, really 
stepping outside morality when we respect (and ‘respect’ here means ‘morally approve 
of ‘) –not his action, but part of his motivation. 
 
This explanation is inadequate, however. From the consensus that the emotion of love 
itself is of high value for the moral life, it does not follow that we either do, or should, 
view all motivation derived from love as to that extent morally commendable.5 There is 
something fishy about the idea that a morally commendable motive can have caused, or 
at least increased the probability of, a wrongful act. A motive which is capable, in 
combination with other motives, of making a wrongful action more likely must at any 
rate have its claims to be morally commendable called into question. A more plausible 
analysis is that, intuitively, we (1) morally approve the loving emotion, (2) morally 
disapprove the ultimate violent action, and (3) take a more complex view of the 
motives, intentions and decision that connect the one to the other. Acknowledging this 
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complexity opens the door to the possibility that non-moral respect may be part of our 
complex response to Alberto's action and its causes. 
 
Moreover, the grounds of our respect are not in fact likely to be restricted to the motive. 
I have noted already that Alberto’s act is (in least in a minimal sense) just, and, 
irrespective of motive, this justness may be a factor in disposing us towards respect for 
the act itself, even if we agree with Alberto that it is morally wrong. The ‘minimal 
justness’ of his action is prima facie evidence of a degree of moral seriousness. 
 
We cannot respect Alberto’s action if we do not construe it as that of a reflective person 
to whom moral considerations are important. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
respect for an action requires that it proceed from a considered decision, not just the 
impulsion of a motive. Emotionally-driven incontinence could not be respected, even in 
such a case as Alberto's, though it could be pitied. In the second place, where an action 
is the outcome of a considered decision among alternative actions, it cannot qualify for 
respect if the morally-indicated alternative has not even been seriously considered, since 
the decision-making process has been grossly defective and the act retains to some 
extent the character of incontinence. But the fact that we require moral awareness and 
reflection by Alberto as a necessary condition if we are to respect his action does not 
mean that our respect is to be identified with moral commendation of his motive. 
Moreover, in order to feel respect, we must be convinced of the justifiable centrality and 
seriousness of the motive in the agent's life. We might perhaps respect a man's travelling 
to Ruritania to revenge a deliberately inflicted, permanently crippling injury to himself, 
but not his travelling to retaliate a transient scratch in a minor scuffle. 
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An elaboration of the example will, I believe, bring out particularly clearly the 
divergence of respect from moral approval. Imagine an alternative version in which 
Alberto does not premeditate revenge but, happening to visit Ruritania and encounter 
the diplomat, kills him in a sudden fit of passion, without ever having reflected upon the 
moral arguments against doing so. The killing in this alternative version would 
generally be seen as less morally heinous than in the original version, because more 
excusable by the swamping of deliberation by emotion, yet the grounds for respect 
would be reduced, since there would be less evidence of the 'centrality and seriousness' 
of the issue in Alberto's life, or of his having soberly reflected upon it. Another way of 
characterising this distinction is to say that in this alternative case we would be more 
inclined to commiserate Alberto, than to respect him, for his action.   
 
The crucial point is this: given the understandable centrality of the motive in his life, the 
more consciously Alberto has set aside the demands of morality after reflecting upon 
them, the more likely we are to respect (even though morally deploring) his action. Thus 
respect acknowledges the importance of morality, since it requires that a condition for 
respecting certain actions is that moral considerations should have been seriously 
considered before they are performed. But the respect endures up to, and beyond, the 
setting aside of the claims of morality. We respect and disapprove at once.  
 
To capture the necessity of moral reflection as a condition for respect, I will not call 
actions like Alberto's 'immoral', since 'immoral' may be taken to imply that moral 
considerations have not even been seriously reflected upon. Instead I will call them 
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'non-moral' when focusing on the fact that they have not been chosen for moral reasons, 
or 'anti-moral' when focusing on the fact that they contradict the course of action which 
morality would require. 
 
To strengthen my general claim for the independence of a certain kind of respect from 
moral approval, here are two more examples, not involving revenge. 
 
Bella, who lives for the happiness of her only son, discovers that he is a serial 
killer. She knows clearly that she ought to betray him to the police, and is 
tormented by the thought of the suffering of his likely future victims, which her 
inaction will have made possible. She tries to dissuade him from further crimes, 
though aware of the ineffectiveness of her pleading. But she cannot bring herself 
to betray him to life imprisonment, or the death penalty: her whole remaining 
existence would be spoiled by the knowledge of his inevitable suffering, and his 
equally inevitable hatred of her as his betrayer. She chooses to obey this motive 
rather than to do as she knows she ought. 
 
Charles has been estranged from Louise for ten years, but is still deeply in love 
with her. Nothing is more important in his life than this love. Meeting her again, 
he discovers that she is now happily married to Stuart, has children to whom she 
is devoted, etc. He knows that there is no prospect whatever that she will leave 
Stuart and return to him. He learns that Louise, though she no longer loves 
Charles, has been troubled by guilt and anxiety about his wounded feelings, and 
would be significantly happier if he assured her that he was contented and had 
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not been unduly grieved by unrequited love. Her misgivings on this point have 
had some negative impact on her marital and family life. Charles is a sufficiently 
good actor to reassure her with conviction if he so chooses, or to behave in a 
way from which his contentment can confidently be inferred. He knows that 
Louise and to a lesser extent her family will feel bad if he reaffirms his love for 
Louise: he accepts the argument that it would be 'selfish' for him to do so. 
Nevertheless, when the occasion arises for him to make a statement, he decides 
to set these moral considerations aside, and says truthfully that he still loves her 
and has never ceased to suffer from his love. He says this because the love is the 
central fact about his existence, and to deny it -or even remain silent about it 
when an occasion to discuss the matter naturally presents itself- would be to 
deny what above all in life he wishes to affirm. 
 
In both these cases, it is possible to 'moralise' the agent's motives: one can say, for 
example, that Bella is motivated by the special obligation of a parent, and Charles by a 
punctilious truthfulness. But this would miss the point. Neither Bella nor Charles is 
unaware of the many moral considerations that bear upon their predicament: like 
Alberto, they are essentially good people, alert to such considerations. Both decide -
surely rightly- that the weight of moral argument lies with the decision that they 
nevertheless do not take. The decision to act, then, is not capable of being moralised. 
The lesser moral argument in its favour is irrelevant: Bella does not shield her son 
because she believes in the special obligations of parents, and Charles does not assert 
his love because he recognises the utility or deontic necessity of truth-telling. They 
choose their actions for non-moral reasons which (if my intuitions are trustworthy) we 
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can respect on the same conditions as for Alberto: the legitimate seriousness and 
centrality of the motive in the person's life, and the sober recognition, even though they 
are set aside, of the claims of morality. 
 
If we now look back at the revenge example, we are reminded that a special factor 
which characterises it, and is absent from the cases of Bella and Charles, is the justness 
of Alberto's act. Though anti-moral but respect-worthy actions are to be found in a 
variety of areas of human conduct, acts of revenge require what can only be called a 
political context. The very concept of revenge implies the existence of some system or 
culture of peaceful reciprocity among human beings, which the original offender has 
transgressed. (This could be very simple, such as the culture of mutual forbearance 
between two people cast away on a desert island.) Revenge requires, indeed its logic 
appeals to, conscious reciprocity. If Dave punches me and I punch him back because his 
punch has put me in a fighting mood, or because I am hurt and lash out instinctively, or 
simply to protect myself against further punches, these are not cases of revenge; only if 
I think  
 
You, Dave, punched me, so I will punch you 
 
-in other words, if there is in my thought an invocation of reciprocity, however 
informal, as signalled here by the logical connective 'so'- am I exacting revenge. This 
'political' condition of revenge is another question too complex to pursue here, but it 
suggests the following thought: that reciprocity in an action may be a contributory 
condition for earning respect, yet not for earning moral approval. That I am 
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reciprocating the wrongful act of another does not prevent my action from being 
morally wrong, but it provides some evidence of the deliberation which is a prerequisite 
for earning respect, and it may attract sympathy to the extent that in it I am conforming 
to a template of human action which I have not initiated (in contrast to the gratuitous act 
of the original assailant.). In short, my act is (minimally) just even though it is morally 
wrong. 
 
If the reader is tempted to maintain -perhaps invoking the diversity of moral codes- that 
the possibility of respect for the kinds of actions we have been discussing must be 
capable of being brought within the category of some kind of moral approval, it is worth 
pointing out how strange it is that this need not seem to be the case to the agent himself. 
For it is clearly possible both (i) to act against whatever moral principles one holds, and 
(ii) to act in a way which would be compatible with a certain set of moral principles, 
without actually holding to those principles. To the argument that Alberto, for example, 
must be practising 'a vendetta morality', or 'a revenge morality', the reply is, firstly, that 
even if he supported such a morality, it need not be his reason for acting, and secondly 
that it would not be necessary for him to believe in any such morality in order to do 
what he does. In short, no moral code, once an agent is aware of it, can be the sufficient 
explanation of his deliberate actions. To bring all actions within the scope of some 
moral code, we would have to take refuge in the claim that whatever a person actually 
does must represent 'his real morality', and that the moral principles Alberto, Bella and 
Charles suppose themselves to have considered and set aside, after painful and profound 
struggles of conscience, are not 'really their moral principles' at all. But this is to empty 
the concept of morality, or moral codes or principles, of any content. 
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IV 
 
The second type of objection to the thesis that B3 judgements exist seeks to invalidate 
the very notion of 'non-moral respect'. It is connected to the first objection in that, in one 
version, it denies the possibility of respect for actions independently of moral approval 
of actions. 'Respect', on this first version of the second objection, is simply an aspect of 
moral approval, or, more loosely, a vague feeling of commendation which can only be 
given determinate application if its morally approving nature is brought into focus. An 
alternative version of the second objection suggests that, properly investigated, the 
supposed phenomenon of respect for actions recognisable in our intuitions will prove to 
have no determinate content, and to be merely a mixed bag of different attitudes -
sympathy or compassion for the agent, partial agreement with her values, recognition of 
mitigation or excuse, etc.  
 
How, then can 'respect' as I have been using the term be given more determinate 
meaning? Among our fellow citizens we can distinguish three broad groups, on the 
basis of the overall pattern of conduct they display: first, those whose actions suggest 
that they live as strictly as they can according to the demands of morality (as they or we 
conceive those demands); second, those for whom morality provides a part of their 
motivation, but who will sometimes prioritise non-moral motives for action over those 
derived from morality, and third, those who actions suggest that they live mainly or 
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exclusively according to non-moral imperatives. In short, some lead the moral life as 
they understand it, some orient at least part of their conduct towards it, and some are 
indifferent to it. (As I have already implied, an underlying assumption of the present 
discussion is that the moral life has some determinate content, difficult and contentious 
though we may find the task of describing it, and is not merely a formal name for 
whatever pattern of priorities governs the conduct of any given person.) Of course this 
tripartite division is simplified, the first and third categories fitting exactly only the 
occasional Mother Theresa or Heinrich Himmler, but everyone will be able to identify 
among their acquaintances people for whom moral considerations appear to weigh 
unusually heavily or unusually lightly. 
 
Most people will, I suspect, place themselves in the second, intermediate category, 
aware that their actions and motivations do not entirely track morality, and perhaps 
wishing -though not usually very intensely- that they could track it more consistently. 
An explanation of respect might then take its cue from a distinction Aristotle draws in 
the Poetics when he identifies the appropriate kind of protagonist for tragedy.6 We 
admire those who, unlike us, belong to the first group and despise those who, unlike us, 
belong to the third. But a special kind of sympathy attaches to those who are alongside 
us in the middle, a sympathy that may rise to respect if they seem to be closer to the 
moral end of the spectrum than we are, or to perform an action that places them there.  
 
So far, this kind of respect equates to, or at least is dependent on, moral approval of an 
action or a pattern of conduct. How, then, can there be respect for non-moral, or anti-
moral actions, such as those of Alberto, Bella and Charles? The answer begins with the 
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observation that the excursions from the moral life performed by those of us in the 
middle group can themselves be categorised in various ways by their motives. Four such 
categories, with examples, are: 
 
1 The negligent. I ought to pay a visit to a relative who would be quite glad to see me, 
but I decide to stay at home and watch television instead. 
 
2 The frivolous. I refrain from offering a needed lift home to a colleague because he 
disagreed with me in a committee debate.  
 
3 The sensuous. I eat the large chocolate bar my parents left for my children on their 
recent visit. 
 
4 The serious. The decisions of Alberto, Bella and Charles. 
 
Intuitively, we want to say more, evaluatively, than that all four of these are 
infringements of the demands of morality. If we try to rank them using a moral 
criterion, the natural way to do so is in terms of the degree of harm they do, expressing 
this either as disutility or as outrage to moral principles of varying degrees of 
importance. On this moral criterion, example 4 would rightly be judged most 
negatively, since the revenger or the child-protector does incomparably more harm than 
is done in the other cases, and even the love-affirmer does considerably more. There is, 
however, another kind of evaluation, on which the revenger, child-protector and love-
affirmer come out ahead of the frivolous, negligent and sensuous person; and the best 
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description for the judgement emerging from this evaluation is respect for non-moral or 
anti-moral action. It is related to the wider 'Aristotelian' moral form of respect by the 
condition that the respected agent (unlike the negligent, frivolous or sensuous anti-
moralist) will have reflected seriously on the demands of morality before setting them 
aside. Anyone who meets this condition will be recognised by us as belonging, like us, 
in the intermediate moral group -'those for whom morality provides a part of their 
motivation'- and the serious nature of their grounds for rejecting morality may even 
cause us to place them among the better members of the group. Another way of putting 
this is that we respect their actions because we think "I can imagine myself, in my most 
serious moments, perhaps choosing as they have chosen".  
 
 A final objection now presents itself. A critic might argue as follows.  
 
“I agree that I may be able to ‘imagine myself, in my most serious moments, choosing 
to perform’, certain actions of which I morally disapprove. I could not, therefore, deny a 
kind of fellow-feeling with those other agents who, having met the condition of 
seriously reflecting on the demands of morality before setting them aside, actually 
perform such actions. But some of these actions might be so bad that I would 
unequivocally deplore them, in spite of my recognition that I myself, even in my most 
serious moments, might have performed them. Now ‘a kind of fellow-feeling’ is 
compatible with this unequivocal deploring: it just means that I realize that I can act as 
badly as the next person. ‘Respect’, on the other hand, suggests something which is, in 
however qualified a way, a positive feeling. The explanation of my respect for Alberto 
as being founded purely on the thought that "I can imagine myself, in my most serious 
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moments, perhaps choosing as he has chosen” cannot be correct, since that thought is 
compatible with unequivocal deploring –that is, the entire absence of any positive 
feeling- and respect is a positive feeling. My respect must, therefore, be founded in 
addition on something else –most plausibly, on some moral consideration, such as the 
thought that Alberto’s killing of the diplomat would have been even more deplorable if 
it had not been provoked.” 
 
The key to this objection is the claim that ‘some actions might be so bad that I would 
unequivocally deplore them, in spite of my recognition that I myself, even in my most 
serious moments, might have performed them’. What kinds of actions can be supposed 
to motivate this response? It is not enough that they should motivate unequivocal moral 
disapproval, since the point in dispute is precisely whether there is such a thing as a 
non-moral positive judgement that can co-exist with unequivocal moral disapproval. 
There must be some additional heinousness or disgracefulness to the act, going beyond 
what is sufficient to ensure moral disapproval, which prompts the observer, not merely 
to disapprove morally, but to foreclose any possibility even of a non-moral positive 
feeling which could credibly be described as ‘respect’–while yet accepting that she can 
‘imagine herself, in her most serious moments, choosing to perform it’.  Are there any 
such acts?  
 
The examples which may seem to substantiate the objection will, I believe, lose their 
force provided we unpack a little the criterion of ‘serious reflection on the demands of 
morality’. It is true, for example, that my judgement of another’s action may have a 
wholly negative character, even if I believe that I myself might have performed the 
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action, if it is a moral lapse of a kind I know I am prone to. Perhaps, for instance, I am 
prone to strike people when arguments become heated: my fellow-feeling would not 
cause me to respect another person who did the same. But we recall that it is a condition 
for respect that the agent should have reflected seriously on the demands of morality 
before setting them aside. To speak of a ‘lapse’ is precisely to assume the absence of 
any such reflection: serious reflection on the demands of morality precludes the kind of 
incontinence of decision-making which can be characterized as a ‘lapse’.  
 
Equally, the requirement that the reflection be ‘serious’ may be taken to preclude the 
kind of ‘reflection on the demands of morality’ which makes those demands subservient 
to some extra-moral end, as in the thought process of a sadist who dwells on his moral 
obligations in order to enjoy transgressing them. The serious setting aside of moral 
obligations cannot be a pleasurable process. 
 
In contrast, the person whose excursion from the moral life can be categorised as 
‘serious’, and so eligible for respect, must keep the demands of morality in continuous 
view, so to speak, and in painful contradistinction to the act he or she decides to 
perform. That persevering clarity and that painfulness of reflection constitute the 
seriousness which provides the foundation for our respect for Albert’s decision. 
 
 
V 
 
 24
Before concluding the paper, I will distinguish my argument for the possibility of non-
moral but respect-worthy actions from various other views with which it might be 
confused.  
 
First, it is not to be construed as a denial of the thesis that moral considerations should 
(or for a wholly rational person, actually do) override all others. The presupposition of 
the thesis is that a rational person can engage in a process of practical reasoning in 
which moral and non-moral considerations are weighed against one another.7 My 
argument does not require this presupposition, and I think it is more plausible to 
suppose that no decisive adjudication before the court of reason between moral and non-
moral considerations is possible: that, roughly speaking, moral considerations are 
overriding from the point of view of the moral life, if that is the one we wish to lead, 
while various non-moral considerations are overriding from various other points of 
view. But even if this presupposition of the overridingness thesis were true, one can 
imagine Alberto, Bella or Charles doing what they actually do, even after deciding at 
the court of reason that they ought to do otherwise. If it is possible to renounce the 
demands of morality in a particular case, it is possible to renounce the status of a wholly 
rational person, if one believes that such a person could not renounce morality. 
 
Second, my view is not, of course, to be confused with the claim that some people act 
non-morally out of some special psychological compulsion. The interest of cases like 
those of Alberto, Bella and Charles lies in the fact that they could act otherwise than 
they do (setting aside determinist arguments that are equally applicable to all human 
action), and would survive as sane human beings if they did so, but would then feel -or 
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at least would now predict of themselves that they will feel- that their life has been 
spoiled. 
 
Third, the non-moral defence must not be confused with a Nietzschean rejection of 
morality itself, or even with the more cautious questioning of the scope of morality's 
demands on us that we find in the work of more recent philosophers such as Bernard 
Williams.8 On the contrary, I have emphasised that a condition of our respect for these 
agents is that they should take morality very seriously: they may even sincerely believe 
in its 'overridingness'. 
 
Fourthly, as I implied above, the kinds of acts defended by the non-moral defence 
cannot be explained away as acts morally justified in rule-utilitarian terms though 
happening not to be 'optimific' in the particular case. A utilitarian rule regarding parents' 
love for their children (or the fostering of such love by our laws and culture) cannot be 
supposed to be formulated so loosely as to fail to exclude killing or omitting to save the 
lives of others.  
 
Nor, fifthly and conversely, are they examples of bad acts carried out for countervailing, 
and overriding, utilitarian reasons, such as the torturing of a terrorist to extract 
information which will save the lives of many others. They are wrongful acts carried out 
in defiance of the most compelling moral arguments recognised by the agent, not to 
fulfil what the agent believes to be overriding moral arguments. (The difference of tone 
here between 'wrongful' and 'bad' reflects the fact that torturing someone is an act which 
decent people cannot respect, because they cannot 'imagine themselves, in their most 
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serious moments' choosing to perform it -and certainly not if it is done in defiance of a 
person's best moral judgement.) 
 
Sixthly, these are not the type of cases, identified by Michael Slote, in which a virtue 
outruns its connection to morality and yet remains, even while doing so, an 'admirable' 
virtue. Slote gives the example of Winston Churchill's single-mindedness in fighting 
Nazism, which we continue to admire (he says) even when it leads Churchill to the 
immoral act of approving the deliberate bombing of large numbers of German 
civilians.9  
 
Superficially, there is a certain resemblance between the idea of admiring a virtue, 
without necessarily morally commending a particular course of conduct which 
exemplifies it, and the idea of respecting an action which is contrary to the demands of 
morality but is motivated by some concern central to the agent's life. The resemblance 
lies in the fact that in both cases morality yields ground to something else, which is 
nevertheless viewed positively in some way. Even in the relation to morality, however, 
there is a crucial difference. In Slote's analysis, it is effectively stipulated from the 
beginning that we are to think of virtues as only partially or loosely correlated with act-
centred moral commendation: indeed, since his purpose is to supplant act-centred 
morality with an ethics of virtue, Slote needs to vindicate the looseness of this relation 
(since if virtues could be paraphrased as sets of act-centred injunctions, the replacement 
would be unnecessary). By re-tightening this loose connection, as it were, we can 
remove the difficulties raised by Slote's cases. In the Churchill case, it is true that we 
have independent evidence of Churchill's single-mindedness in fighting Nazism, and if 
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we admire this as a virtue we are involved in a certain dilemma of assessment when this 
very virtue causes an immoral act, especially if we believe, as Slote suggests, that 
Churchill could not have done otherwise given his possession of this particular virtue. 
But we can resolve this dilemma, without doing harm to common-sense intuitions, by 
abandoning the assumption that single-mindedness in fighting Nazism is entirely a 
virtue, since we see that it can sometimes lead to immoral acts, and we think immoral 
acts are inconsistent with virtue; or, more generally, by recognizing that the moral 
significance we attach to anyone's personal qualities (a significance which may 
sometimes lead us to say they possess a virtue) is merely a summary of our assessment 
of the moral worth of the actions they motivate, and so undergoes perpetual revision as 
new actions are added. We are not obliged (except perhaps by some versions of virtue 
ethics) to say of any personal quality, "once a virtue, always a virtue". 
 
In contrast, in my explanation of respect for non-moral actions, morality is assigned a 
fixed position, in that its demands have been consciously identified and then set aside 
by the agent after serious reflection. In my examples, there is no dilemma to resolve: 
rather, there is a complete stand-off between the admitted demands of morality and what 
the agent decides to do.  
 
Moreover, our non-moral respect for the actions of Alberto, Bella and Charles is not 
dependent on our having any independent evidence of their actions instantiating some 
admired virtue they possess. We could respect Alberto's action, for example, even if he 
had previously shown mainly the virtue of forbearance, which his action repudiates, and 
not particularly the kinds of virtues under which his revenging action might possibly be 
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subsumed, such as resolution or a sense of justice. Admittedly, we could find in 
Alberto's or Bella's actions the 'virtue of parental love' outrunning morality, while 
Charles's could exemplify the 'virtue of frank speaking', or the 'virtue of enduring erotic 
love'. But even if we admit these to the canon of virtues (and they are surely more 
generally understood as natural inclinations to which most people attach a lot of 
importance), it is implausible that we should ground our respect for the actions upon 
these virtues. In Slote's Churchill case, we look to Churchill's virtue as an excuse for an 
action we condemn (or if we do not condemn it, it is because we believe it to be morally 
justified for some reason): we think "I can imagine that a person with this special virtue 
might commit such an act". In the cases of Alberto, Bella and Charles, we do not look 
for an excuse for the act, because it is the act itself we respect: we think, "I, an ordinary 
person without a special virtue, might commit this act". 
 
A closer analogy to our respect for certain actions counter to morality is provided by 
Slote's development of the 'Gauguin' example, introduced by Bernard Williams to 
support the notion of 'moral luck' in 1976 and widely discussed thereafter.10 The painter 
Gauguin decides to abandon his family and to settle in Tahiti, in the belief that this will 
liberate his artistic potential. Let us follow Slote in judging that this is an anti-moral act, 
and that it is motivated by a non-moral value central to Gauguin's life, his 'passion for 
art'; let us add, to bring the example closer to those of Alberto, Bella and Charles, that 
Gauguin considers the claims of morality very carefully before deciding to ignore them. 
If we set aside, as Slote does, various attempts at moral justification for Gauguin's 
desertion of his family, then we may be prepared to say that we respect Gauguin's non-
moral passion, even though we condemn the anti-moral act to which it leads him. In 
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contrast to the Churchill case, we do not need to view the passion for art as a virtue; the 
point of our respect is that it matters intensely in Gauguin's life -more intensely, it turns 
out, than morality does- and we can understand that there might be something in a 
person's life that matters even more than morality. If we have our own share of the 
passion for art, we may particularly readily understand why a creative artist would 
attach an enormous value to it. However, I am less convinced that we are likely to 
respect the anti-moral act in Gauguin's case than in the cases of Alberto, Bella and 
Charles. I can think of two explanations for this intuition, and the explanations have a 
common underlying feature. Firstly, it is harder in Gauguin's case to give credence to a 
belief that his life would be spoiled if he did not leave his family and go to the South 
Seas: because of the unpredictable course of an artist's creative development, and the 
possibility that family life and creative fulfilment might after all be capable of being 
reconciled, the situation is less critical, less all-or-nothing than in the other cases. 
Secondly, Gauguin's decision, in contrast with those of Alberto, Bella and Charles, is to 
undertake a course of action likely to lead to pleasure, fulfilment and fame for himself, 
and these prospects are very different from that of allaying an intolerable pain. The 
common underlying point is that Gauguin's decision (as Williams sees clearly) is part of 
a long-term life project, and renunciations of morality are likely to seem to an observer 
less eligible for respect when they occur in the course of an agent's planning a long-term 
project than when they occur in the face of a crisis not of the agent's own choosing. One 
thing we respect people for is the work they put into reconciling their projects with 
morality, and they may forfeit our respect if they seem to be shunning this work; but it 
is a distinctive feature of the predicaments of Alberto, Bella and Charles that they are 
externally imposed and cannot be planned for. For similar reasons, we may respect, 
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without morally commending or excusing, the decision which puts aside moral 
constraints in the service of a quite exceptional and overpowering erotic passion. (This 
is why the love-potion inadvertently drunk by Tristan and Isolde prior to their adultery 
is important. It does not create their mutual passion -at least not in Wagner's version of 
the story- but it provides an external symbol of its exceptional, and as it were 
involuntary, nature, and so helps the audience to view Tristan's consequent betrayal of 
his loyalty to King Marke, by which he is himself deeply grieved, with a certain 
sympathy.) On the other hand, a man's rejection of moral obligations in the pursuit of a 
sustained project of having sex with as many women as possible may be understood but 
hardly respected.  
  
 
      VI 
 
I have tried to demonstrate the possibility of respect for certain kinds of actions which 
are contrary to the demands of morality. Among the actions we can feel this kind of 
respect for are acts of private revenge, under certain conditions which include their 
being just. If this idea is accepted, it may contribute something to various questions in 
moral and political philosophy. Among other possibilities, I believe it will help us 
towards an understanding of how actions may be just and yet morally wrong, and of the 
complex reciprocal character of political life. 
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RESPECT FOR JUST REVENGE 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 It is a feature of the existing literature, however, that discussion of private revenge (or 
more commonly, of vengeful attitudes and emotions, as distinct from acts) almost 
always occurs in the context of theories of law, justice and punishment. There are 
widely divergent views on the relation of vengeance to lawful punishment (ranging 
from the firm separation proposed by Hobbes, Bentham and others, through the 
disquieted equivocation of Sidgwick, to the suspicions voiced by Durkheim and 
Nietzsche that the latter is a rationalisation of the former), and to disentangle the one 
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theme from the other in the literature would require a separate paper. For some 
examples of this entanglement, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. J.A.K.Thomson 
& H.Tredennick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), IV, v (1126a), 161-2, and V, v 
(1132b-1133a), 182-4; Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, tr. J.Ladd 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1983), 100-102, and ‘Vengeance’, Lectures on Ethics, tr. 
L.Infield (London: Methuen, 1930), 214; Hobbes, The Elements of Law, ed. 
J.C.A.Gaskin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), ch. IX, 52, and Leviathan, ed. R.Tuck 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. XV, 106, ch. XXVIII, 215-6; 
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ss. 8-9, ed. P.Laslett (New York; Cambridge 
University Press, 1963), 312-3; Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1967), X, 10 &n, 218;  X, 26, 230-231; X, 34, 236; XIII, 2 &n, 281-282; 
T.H. Green, ‘Principles of Political Obligation’, L, Works of Thomas Hill Green, Vol. 
II, ed. R.L.Nettleship (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1893), 486-511, esp. 487-9; 
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th Edition, 1907 (London: Macmillan, 1967), VII, 1, 
321-324; Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, tr. W.D.Halls (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), 44-52;. D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990); Ted Honderich, Punishment (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 
15, 42-3; and Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988),  26, 34-5, 57, 
184.  
 
2 Examples are D.B.Hershenov, 'Restitution and Revenge', The Journal of Philosophy 
96:2 (1999), 79-94, and Charles F.B. Barton Getting Even: Revenge as a Form of 
Justice (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, (1999). 
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3 Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E.F.J.Payne (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
1995), 69. 
 
4 Or, if knowing another's belief is thought to be mysterious, of respect for another's 
expressed opinion which one believes to have been sincerely expressed. 
 
5 There is, of course, a long literary tradition of exploring the crimes into which love can 
lead us. The theme can be traced in the Paolo and Francesca episode in Dante (Inferno, 
V), in Arthurian tales such as that of Lancelot and Guinevere, and in the novels of 
Graham Greene (The Power and the Glory, The Heart of the Matter). The emotional 
power of these narratives comes precisely from their presenting the reader with this 
tragic tension between incommensurable values: the well-grounded law that condemns 
an immoral act, and the human power and dignity of the love that causes individuals, 
not unaware or disapproving of the law, to commit that very act. 
 
6 13: 1453a ; Aristotle, Poetics, trans. M.E.Hubbard, in Classical Literary Criticism 
(Oxford: World's Classics, 1989), 66-67. 
 
7 See, for example, Neil Cooper, The Diversity of Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), 105-07; cf. Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?', Virtues 
and Vices (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981), 181-88, and John Kekes, 'On There Being Some 
Limits to Morality', in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr. and Jeffrey Paul, The Good 
Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 63-80. 
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8 See, for example, 'Morality, the Peculiar Institution', in his Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (London: Collins, 1985), 174-96. 
 
9 Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality', in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), 77-107. See especially section IV, 93-100. I am indebted to this essay of 
Slote's at several points in the present discussion. 
 
10 Bernard Williams, 'Moral luck', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 
50; reprinted in revised form in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 20-39. For Slote, see note 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
